Four commissurotomy patients were tested for ability to match tachistoscopically presented stimuli with pictures in free vision, according to either structural appearance or functional/conceptual category. Patients were given ambiguous, structural, or functional instructions on any given run of trials with simultaneous double stimulus input to the two cerebral hemispheres. With ambiguous instructions, appearance and function matches were performed by the right and left hemispheres, respectively. When instructions were specific, appearance instructions tended to elicit appearance matches and right-hemisphere control. When function instructions were given, lefthemisphere control and function matches tended to be elicited. In three of the four patients, however, there was a significant number of dissociations between controlling hemisphere and strategy of matching.
Previous studies of split-brain patients have revealed that the right hemisphere is superior for visual-spatial transformations (Bogen & Gazzaniga, 1965; Levy-Agresti & Sperry, 1968; Nebes, 1971) and for the recognition of complex visual patterns (Levy, Trevarthen, & Sperry, 1972) , while the left hemisphere is superior for speech and calculation (Sperry, Gazzaniga, & Bogen, 1969) , The subjects examined were patients of Doctors Philip Vogel of the California College of Medicine and Joseph Bogen of the Ross-Loos Medical Group, Los Angeles. The authors express their appreciation to Professor Roger W. Sperry in whose laboratory of psychobiology this study was conducted. We are much indebted to him for his encouragement and advice.
Requests for reprints should be addressed to Jerre Levy, Department of Psychology, 3813 Walnut Street, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19174. for semantic decoding of written words, and for phonetic analysis (Levy & Trevarthen, Note 1) . These findings confirm and extend earlier conclusions regarding hemispheric specialization drawn from studies of unilaterally brain-damaged patients (Bogen, 1969; Hecaen, 1969) .
In split-brain studies to date, tests for hemispheric specialization have measured cerebral abilities by comparing response accuracies of the two hemispheres for particular tasks in which a single, correct response was available to each hemisphere. Typically, each hemisphere has been tested separately to determine the extent of its abilities, a method allowing assessment of capacity differences between the two sides of the brain, but precluding assessment of the relative dispositions of the two hemispheres to take control of processing and to respond. Levy and Trevarthen (Note 1) and Levy etal. (1972) , utilizing a double presentation technique similar to one employed in earlier experiments with monkeys (Trevarthen, 1962 (Trevarthen, , 1965 in 299 which two different stimuli are simultaneously presented, one in each half of the visual field, have been able to determine not only how well each hemisphere can handle a particular task (hemispheric ability), but the degree to which each half-cerebrum tends to assume control of processing and behavior (hemispheric dominance). Although the double-presentation paradigm has permitted the determination of dominance (in the sense defined above), as well as ability differences, it has not addressed itself to the problem of what we would call metacontrol.
By metacontrol, we refer to the neural mechanisms that determine which hemisphere will attempt to control cognitive operations. Although, theoretically, it is conceivable that no such independent mechanism exists, and that so-called "dominance" is merely a reflection of either total incapacity of one hemisphere to respond at all, or of a speed contest between the two halves of the brain in which one half consistently wins, data from Levy et al. (1972) tend to refute this. In a test of pattern recognition of patterns constructed of vertically oriented permutations of three Xs and squares, they found that in a free-response situation, when either hemisphere could have taken control of responding, the right hemisphere was strongly dominant. However, when the left hemisphere was forced to take control of responding, by requiring a verbal description of the pattern stimulus, the left hemisphere performed at a significantly superior level as compared with the right hemisphere under free-response conditions. Thus, there was a negative correlation on this test between dominance, on the one hand, and ability, on the other. This result strongly suggests that a capacity difference between the two sides of the brain is not the sole determinant of hemispheric dominance; that, in fact, a hemisphere assumes control of processing as a result of set or expectation as to the nature of processing requirements prior to actual information processing, and that it remains in control even if its performance, for whatever reasons, is considerably worse than that which could have been produced by the opposite side of the brain. If so, this would imply that hemispheric specialization refers not only to quantitative ability differences and qualitative strategy differences, but to metacontrol processes as well, that is, to a dispositional specialization.
Though understanding is very incomplete regarding the anatomy of a possible switching mechanism, given the known complexity of activation functions attributable to the reticular -systems of the brain stem, it is reasonable to guess that activating impulses can be asymmetrically routed to one or the other hemisphere under the influence of descending neural activity from cortical regions. An elegant example of such reciprocal hemisphere-brain-stem control comes from the double ablation experiment of Sprague (1966) . A phenomenon found with human commissurotomy patients, which Trevarthen has called "perceptual erasure," suggests that the generation of a response in one hemisphere may lead to profound modifications of perceptions in the other hemisphere via brain-stem systems (Trevarthen, 1974) . In earlier work with these patients, difficulty in testing the right hemisphere was sometimes encountered clue to confabulated responses by the left. Attempts to inhibit such interfering responses via distracting tasks generally led to such a reduced level of consciousness in the right half of the brain, that it was almost impossible to elicit any responses whatsoever from it (Levy, 1970) . In tests with bilateral presentation of stimuli, fluctuations in the balance of perceptual processes in the two hemispheres of central origin are commonly observed (Kinsbourne, 1974; Trevarthen, 1974; Trevarthen & Sperry, 1973) . In the intact brain, it would be expected that asymmetric activation would be, in part, maintained via callosally mediated inhibition or shunting. In the commissurotomy patient the inactive hemisphere might be kept in its inactive state either by deficient "arousal" or this in combination with actual inhibitory input from brain-stem regions. In any case, if asymmetric activation can be initiated and possibly maintained by set or expectation alone, it must be the case that there is within each hemisphere, a specialized disposition to act that comes into play before ability differences can be manifested. It follows, therefore, that such dispositional spe-cialization is to a certain extent separate from ability or strategic specializations.
In order to explore the nature of this postulated metacontrol system, we designed a test in which the two hemispheres would necessarily compete for the control of Ijhe response. Two possible correct responses were available to each hemisphere, one reflecting one processing strategy, the other reflecting another processing strategy; one or the other strategy could be selectively called for by instructions given the subject. Based on previous work, we felt relatively certain that the right hemisphere was specialized to respond to visuo-structural similarities between two stimuli, and that the left hemisphere was specialized to respond to functional-conceptual similarities between two stimuli. These we may call the typical response modes of the hemispheres.
We sought to answer several questions, (a) With instructions ambiguous with respect to strategy, which hemisphere would control the response and what strategy would it use? (b) With unambiguous instructions, would the instructions be effective in eliciting the appropriate strategy? (c) With unambiguous instructions, would one or the other hemisphere be selectively activated to take control of responding? (d) Would unambiguous instructions ever be followed by a dissociation between the controlling hemisphere and the strategy utilized, either activating the appropriate hemisphere but not its typical strategy, or the appropriate strategy but not the hemisphere that typically integrates it?
METHOD Subjects
The same four patients, C. C., A. A., N. G., and L. B., were tested as in a previous article where the individual case descriptions are given (Levy et al, 1972) . These patients had all undergone total forebrain commissurotomy for control of intractable epilepsy. In all cases, the surgery was effective in reducing the severity and frequency of seizures.
It should be mentioned that these patients had all been repeatedly tested for a number of years on a large variety of tests, and one in particular, L. B., was quite knowledgeable regarding the nature of his surgery and the functional consequences. The other three subjects, although experienced in test taking, have little or no understanding of neuroanatomy, the nature of commissurotomy surgery, or the functional consequences of such surgery. Their IQs range from borderline to low normal, and they appear to 6e usually unaware of the various disabilities they display in the testing situation. Even when they occasionally perceive some failure, they do not attribute any particular significance to it. As an example, some years ago, N. G. was tested by the first author for her ability to name objects placed in her left hand. She gave a series of confabulated responses and at the end of testing asked, "How did I do?" She was told, "Just fine." She grinned broadly and said, "Please tell my husband how good I am because he's always saying I'm stupid, and I bet he couldn't do as well as I did."
On the other hand, L. B. (at least his left hemisphere) has an above average verbal IQ on the full verbal scale of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale and a scaled score of 16 on the Similarities subtest (yielding a prorated verbal IQ of 130). It is clear that he has a high analytic intelligence, and he is able to describe his surgery and the theoretical consequences quite accurately. However, one has a very strong impression that his intellectual understanding is completely separate from his ordinary self-consciousness. In conversation, it appears that his "I" refers to the same "I" he referred to prior to surgery. His left hemisphere experiences itself as a whole, unified stream of consciousness with no awareness of being split away from any part of itself. Although he may say, upon questioning, "I cannot name objects in the left visual field because the information is conveyed to my right hemisphere which has no language centers and, because of surgery, that information cannot reach my left hemisphere," this intellectual knowledge had no effects on the left hemisphere's consciousness of itself. The impression left with an investigator is that L. B.'s knowledge of reality has no more effect on his perceptions than does a psychologist's knowledge of the mechanisms underlying perceptual constancies have on brightness perception.
For the above reasons, we do not feel that L. B.'s understanding or the experience of the other subjects invalidates any generalizations that may be drawn from their performances. We believe that the basic effects seen in this and in earlier investigations would occur equally in totally naive splitbrain patients.
Apparatus and Stimuli
A modified two-channel tachistoscope, described previously (Levy et al., 1972) , was used for stimulus presentation, one field consisting of a blue fixation field with a red fixation point, the other consisting of the stimulus field in which white stimulus cards with black line drawings were presented against a black velvet, light-absorbing background, so that stimuli would appear briefly against the blue field with no perceivable light flash. Visual fixation was verified by means of continuously recorded electrooculograms. See Levy et al. (1972) for a complete technical description. Figures 1 and 2 ) were black line drawings of common objects in which the left and right halves of each stimulus were made up of two different half-pictures joined at the vertical midline. The chimeric stimuli were exposed for 150 msec with the vertical midline accurately superimposed over the fixation point, so that the left half of the stimulus was projected entirely to the right hemisphere and the right half of the stimulus to the left hemisphere. Under these conditions, as we showed previously (Levy et al., 1972; Trevarthen, 1974; Levy & Trevarthen, Note 1) , each hemisphere seems to effect a perceptual completion of the half-stimulus it receives and, by all tests we could give, appears to perceive a whole stimulus.
Stimuli (shown in

Procedure
Subjects were told that they would see some picture in the "machine" and that they were to choose, by pointing, from the pictures that lay on the table before them in free vision, the one that was similar to the stimulus they had seen. The instructions varied as to specificity, in some cases consisting of the direction merely to "select the one which is similar to, goes with, or is like in some way the one you see" (ambiguous instruction) ; in others consisting of the instruction to "pick the thing that looks similar to what you see" (appearance instruction) ; and sometimes consisting of the instruction to "pick the thing you would use with or that normally goes with what you see" (function instruction). For each stimulus picture, there existed a choice picture that was similar to it in appearance (visuo-structural similarity) and another that either belonged to the same conceptual category or had some functional relation with it (conceptual-functional similarity). Thus, in each trial, either hemisphere could respond, and either strategy of matching could be used.
Whole stimuli (shown in Figures 1 and 2 ) were displayed in free vision to 10 graduate students who were asked to select from the choice pictures those which matched a stimulus in appearance and those which matched it in functional category. All 10 students matched the stimuli and choices according to the matches shown in the figures, although one added that the scissors and knife and fork were both made of metal and that, therefore, they could be said to belong to the same superordinate category. Nevertheless, we felt that the matches were sufficiently consistent to warrant the paradigm and analysis employed. Figure 1 shows the stimuli for Version 1 of the test, used only with patient N. G. and with ambiguous instructions. The primary purpose of this test was (a) to determine the spontaneous strategy of matching that would be used, (b) to ascertain which hemisphere would assume control of behavior, and (c) to test the hypothesis that appearance matching, if it occurred, would be performed by the right hemisphere, and that conceptual-functional matching, if it occurred, would be performed by the left hemisphere.
Version 2 of the test (shown in Figure 2 ) was administered to all subjects and was given with appearance instructions on some runs and with function instructions on other runs. We sought to determine the effectiveness of instructions in (a) producing the appropriate strategy of matching and (b) in eliciting appropriate hemispheric control.
We were particularly interested in seeing whether an instruction-induced set would consistently produce both the appropriate strategy as well as the appropriate hemispheric control, or whether, on some occasions, there might be a dissociation between the two.
OBSERVATIONS
Version 1
Possible responses to three of the six chimeras (Figure 1 , Set A) could be matched as left-field-appearance, right-field-functional, or bilaterally as left-field-functional and right-field-appearance. As an example, consider Chimera 3-2 in Set A, in which a cake is displayed in the left field and scissors in the right field. If a subject selects the knife and fork as a response, this matches the left field functionally and right field in appearance. If he chooses the hat, this is a unilateral appearance match with the left field; if he chooses the thread, this is a unilateral functional match with the right field. The other three chimeras in Figure 1 (Set B) could be matched as left-field-functional, right-field-appearance, or bilaterally as leftfield-appearance and right-field-functional. Chimera 2-3 (Set B), with the scissors on the left and cake on the right, can be seen to match any of the three choices in a reversed direction from Chimera 3-2 (Set A). Thus, on any given trial, any of the three possible choices matched some aspect of the chimera, and there was no possibility of an "error" response. If, however, the right hemisphere inherently prefers appearance matches, and the left hemisphere inherently prefers functional matches, then it would be expected that unilateral responses would be given to Set A stimuli, while bilateral responses would be given to Set B stimuli.
A total of 48 trials, 24 Set A and 24 Set B, were given to N. G. with the following instructions: "You will see a picture in the machine which is similar to, goes with, or is like in some way, one of the three pictures here (experimenter pointing to the three choice pictures). You are to point to the choice which goes with what you see." The instructions were, therefore, ambiguous with respect to the strategy to be used for matching. On half of the Set A and Set B trials, N. G. pointed with her right hand and on half with her left hand. There were no dif- On 45 out of the 48 trials, N. G. either made a left-appearance, right-functional, or bilateral left-appearance/right-functional match. Only on three trials was the mode of matching as a function of field different from the above. These three trials were all a choice of the spools of thread when the chimeric stimulus consisted of scissors in the left field and eyeglasses in the right field. It should be noted that the scissors, in addition to belonging to the same conceptual category as the spools of thread, also have a certain similarity in appearance as well. The angle of the blades is similar to the angle of the spools, and the finger and thumb holes resemble the bottoms of the spools. It is, therefore, not certain that even these three responses were in fact left-functional/rightappearance responses. They may instead represent left-appearance responses.
In any case, the results decisively show that matching by the right hemisphere is normally done by N. G. in terms of visuostructural similarity and by the left hemisphere in terms of conceptual-functional similarity. Each hemisphere was capable of controlling the response and when it did so, it interpreted the instructions and responded in accordance with its own preferred mode of operation. N. G.'s results strongly support the view that whenever a hemisphere spontaneously assumes control of behavior, it processes information in accordance with a strategy appropriate to the specialization of that hemisphere.
These findings, however, do not necessarily imply that instructions as to strategy will always evoke the appropriate mode of matching or the appropriate hemisphere. When a hemisphere assumes control spontaneously, the postulated metacontrol mechanism may cause it to do so only if, for whatever reasons, the activated hemisphere is prepared for information processing and is ready to process according to its particular specialization. If, on the other hand, the subject is instructed to use a cognitive strategy for which one hemisphere is specialized, the possibility exists that, because of internal, time-variant processes, the demand from without may be incongruent with the internal state. If this were to occur, the instructions may result in less than optimal cognitive processing, either activating the appropriate hemisphere but failing to elicit the appropriate strategy, or eliciting the appropriate strategy but failing to .activate the appropriate hemisphere. Such a dissociation could, of course, occur only if those systems of the brain that selectively activate one or the other hemisphere are, to some extent, independent of the mechanisms responsible for quantitative and qualitative differences in capacity of the two sides of the brain. In order to explore the consequences of external demands, Version 2 of the test was given.
Version 2
Of the 12 possible chimeras (see Figure  2 ) the four of Set X would necessarily yield unilateral responses (left-appearance, rightappearance, right-functional, or left-functional) ; the four of Set Y would yield either bilateral atypical responses (left-functional/ right-appearance), erroneous responses, or unilateral typical responses (left-appearance or right-functional) ; and the four of Set Z would yield either bilateral typical responses (left-appearance/right-functional), erroneous responses, or unilateral atypical responses (left-functional or right-appearance). The sets of stimuli and possible responses are shown in Table 1 . Again, as for Version 1 of the test, a chimera within a particular Version 2 X, Y, or Z set could be matched only in certain ways. For example, Chimera 1-3, a Set Y chimera, with gloves on the left and the cake on the right, can yield a left-appearance response if the bird is picked, a right-functional response if the knife and fork is picked, a left-functional/ right-appearance response if the hat is picked, and an error response if the sewing basket is picked. The designation "typical" or "atypical" in Table 1 is for the purpose of helping the reader keep in mind the kinds of responses in which matching strategies and hemispheres are congruent versus those in which they are not, and they refer only to correct responses. Obviously, an erroneous response is neither typical or atypical. Set Z chimeras were discarded in order to restrict responses as much as possible to unilateral answers, so that we could determine unambiguously which hemisphere was in control of the response.
For any given run of trials subjects were instructed either to "pick the thing that looks like what you see" (appearance instruction) or to "pick the thing you would use with or goes with what you see" (function instruction). Table 2 shows the distribution of responses of each subject under the two sets of instructions. The frequencies in parentheses are the a priori chance-expected frequencies. Some subjects were brought in for repeated tests when the pattern of response required clarification. Others were occasionally unable to complete a particular run of trials. These exigencies account for the differences 15 (4) 1 (2) 0 (2) 0(4) 0 (4) 16 c. c.
19 (8) 2 (4) 1 (4) 0 (8) 10 (8) 32 N. G.
16 (20) 10 (10) 16 (10) 23 (20) IS (20) (17) (9) (9) (17) (17) C. C.
3 (8) 14 (4) 0(4) 0(8) 15 (8) 32 N. G.
2 (8) 0(4) 0(4) 30 (8) 0 (8) 32 L. B.
0 (16) 1 (8) 11 (8) 40 (16) 12 (16) 64 Note. Numbers in parentheses represent chance-expected frequencies. There were 16 trials per unit run. L sponse, R = right-field response, A = appearance match, F = functional match.
left-field rein the numbers of trials completed by subjects for a given test.
Because the chance probabilities of responses in any given category are unequal, the absolute distribution of responses conveys little understanding of the subjects' behavior. In addition, bilateral or erroneous responses do not provide information regarding controlling hemisphere or strategy of matching used. Therefore, Figure 4 displays the response distribution, with bilateral or erroneous responses excluded, as proportional increases or decreases of observed responses relative to proportions expected.
It will be seen that for all subjects except N. G., appearance instructions elicited a predominance of appearance matches almost entirely to left-field (right-hemisphere) stimuli for A. A. and C. C. and equally distributed between the hemispheres for L. B. For all subjects except C. C., function instructions elicited a predominance of right-field (lefthemisphere) functional matches.
The significance of the distribution of subjects' responses was tested for each subject individually by x 2 tests, in which a variety of relationships were assessed. In all cases, bilateral and erroneous responses were excluded from consideration unless otherwise noted. In order to determine whether there was a significant association between instructional condition and controlling hemisphere, a 2 X 2 table was set up with instruction (appearance or function) as one dimension and hemisphere as the other dimension. All subjects, including N. G. and C. C., manifested a significant Instructional Condition X Hemisphere interaction, x 2 AA(l) -14.61, X 2 cc(l) = 21.30, X 2 NG(1) -17.41, and X 2 L B (1) = 21.66; for all subjects, p < .001 and x 2 TO T (4) = 74.98, p < .001. Similarly, a 2 X 2 table with instruction as one dimension and matching strategy as the other was set up to assess whether subjects correctly matched according to instructions. All subj ects except C. C. manifested a significant Instructional Condition X Strategy of Matching interaction, X'AA(I) = 21.36, x 2 cc(l) = .02 (with a Yates correction), x 2 No(l) -H-90, and x 2 uj(l) = 112.14; for all subjects, X 2 TOT(4) = 145.42, p < .001 for all except C. C. The significant Instructional Condition X Hemisphere interactions indicate that all subjects had a greater tendency to use the right hemisphere than the left under appearance instructions and/or a greater tendency to use the left hemisphere than the right under function instructions. The significant Instructional Condition X Strategy of Matching interactions for A. A., L. B., and N. G. indicate that appearance and functional matches tended to emerge with appearance and function instructions, respectively.
The lack of a significant interaction for C. C. can be seen from Table 2 and Figure 4 to be due to his consistent use of an appearance matching strategy, regardless of instruction. Although N. G.'s response distribution under appearance instruction did not differ significantly from chance, because of the fact that it did differ under function instruction, both the Instruction X Hemisphere and Instruction X Strategy interactions were significant.
Since left-appearance and right-functional responses were twice as likely a priori as right-appearance or left-functional responses, the interaction between hemispheres and strategies could not be tested with a 2 X 2 design. Instead, responses were allocated to one of two categories, one category containing left-appearance and right-functional responses and the other category containing right-appearance and left-functional responses. The observed frequencies in these categories were then tested against their expected frequencies. In spite of the effectiveness of instructions in eliciting either unihemispheric control and/or the appropriate processing strategy, the Hemisphere X Strategy interaction, summing across instructional conditions, was only significant for A. A., xWl) = 10.76, p < .001; X 2 cc(l) = 1.85, p>.!0; x 2 N G (l) = 1-86, p > .10; x 2 L B (l) = 1.01, p > .10. Thus, except for A. A., strategies and hemispheres were not consistently associated. For A. A., the association was significant both under appearance instructions, x 2 (l) = 5.27, p < ,025; and under function instructions, x 2 (l) = 6.08, p < .025.
The lack of overall association in the other three subjects was caused by differing factors.
For C. C., 38 of his total of 39 unilateral responses were appearance matches, yet under appearance instructions, his right hemisphere was in control, while under function instructions his left hemisphere was in control. The effectiveness of instructions in eliciting appropriate hemispheric control, and their ineffectiveness in eliciting the appropriate matching strategy, implies absence of a significant localization of strategy within one or the other hemisphere.
For N. G., the lack of interaction is due solely to her performance under appearance instructions. Under function instructions, the interaction was significant, x 2 (l) = 16.01, p < .01, all responses being allocated to the right-functional (30 responses) or left-appearance (two responses) category. However, under appearance instructions, N. G. continued to make functional matches (39 of 65 responses) and distributed her responses approximately equally between the hemispheres. Of the 32 right hemisphere responses she gave, fewer than chance were appearance matches and more than chance were functional matches, x 2 (l) = 3.99, p < .05, while her 33 left-hemisphere responses were randomly distributed between strategies. It would appear that appearance instructions for N. G. produced cognitive confusion, inducing more right-hemisphere control than was seen with function instructions but failing, to a certain extent, to induce the appropriate matching strategy. It seems that control of the response shifted between the hemispheres as a function of instruction and that the controlling hemisphere was then unable to selectively utilize its specialized strategy. It is of interest that N. G. produced significantly more bilateral responses and errors under appearance instructions than under function instructions, x 2 (l) = 6.94, ing little evidence that he was utilizing his right hemisphere at all.
In an attempt to break the hold that the left hemisphere seemed to have on his behavior, a second run of 24 trials was given immediately after the first in which L. B. had to point with his left hand. A dramatic change occurred: There was a single error, but 23 of the 24 responses were either leftappearance or left-appearance/right functional. Thus, left-hand pointing was powerfully effective in releasing the right hemisphere.
The question, of course, was whether the right hemisphere would be able to retain its behavioral control if pointing was switched back to the right hand. A final run of 12 trials under appearance instructions was given with right-hand pointing. On all 12 trials L. B. gave left-appearance or left-appearance/right-functional responses (8 of the former and 4 of the latter). It appeared that our "training" procedure had produced a change in the control capacity of the right half of the brain. This cannot be interpreted as simply a brief activation effect, since if it were, our second run of trials with left-hand pointing should have produced the same results as the first run with right-hand pointing. In addition, the last 12 trials of the 36 function instruction trials were given immediately after the third appearance instruction run, and all of these resulted in right-functional or left-appearance/right-functional responses.
We conclude from these observations that, though L. B. may have a left hemisphere that tends to dominate behavior, the right hemisphere can be released, and it is selectively released by appearance instructions when the left hand has been brought into play and produces appearance matches.
We also used the revised Version 2 to investigate N. G.'s failure to perform appearance matches under appearance instructions and her use of her right hemisphere under such instructions to perform function matches (see Figure 4) . On 24 trials under function instructions she replicated her previous performance : All 24 responses were rightfunctional or left-appearance/right-functional with no errors. On 24 trials under appearance instructions, she made 5 errors, gave 15 right-appearance or left-functional/right-appearance responses, 2 right-functional responses, 1 left-appearance response, and 1 left-appearance/right-functional response. These results are quite different from her earlier ones on the original Version 2. There (see Figure 4) she tended to make functional matches under appearance instructions, though using her right hemisphere. Here, she correctly made appearance matches but used her left hemisphere, producing results similar in certain respects to L. B.'s on the original Version 2. The change in L. B.'s response pattern is mainly a quantitative change that is an amplification of his performance on the original test. His performance under function instructions is unchanged, while the effectiveness of appearance instructions in producing right-hemisphere control has increased from 62% on the original test to 100% on the revised test, presumably as a result of giving him practice with the left hand.
In contrast, N. G.'s performance on the revised test is a qualitative change from that on the original Version 2. On the original test of Version 2 her responses under appearance instructions were randomly allo- cated across categories, though a plurality of responses were functional matches with the right hemisphere. In the original test she did show a significant association between instructional condition and hemispheres, and a smaller significant association between instructional condition and strategy. However, in the revised test, the only effect of instruction was to shift the strategy of matching, but almost all matches were done by the left hemisphere. As suggested previously, appearance instructions for N. G. seem to produce variable performance and cognitive confusion. She manifested three different patterns of results on three different tests. On Version 1 with ambiguous instructions, she showed an extremely strong association between hemispheres and matching strategy. On the original Version 2, she showed a functional matching bias, the effect of appearance instructions being to shift behavioral control from the left to right hemisphere, which then proceeded to make function matches. On the Revised Version 2, she showed a left-hemisphere bias, the effect of appearance instructions being to shift strategies from functional to appearance matching; processing was retained by the left hemisphere.
DISCUSSION
It is clear from the results that instructional condition was a significant determinant of hemispheric control. In addition, except for subject C. C, instructions were effective in inducing the appropriate matching strategy. Further, although N. G. on Version 1, A. A. on the original Version 2, and L. B. on the Revised Version 2 displayed a significant Hemisphere X Strategy interaction, it is equally obvious that dissociations between hemispheres and strategies were not uncommon.
On the original Version 2, C. C., L. B., and N. G. all manifested such dissociations. C. C. switched hemispheres appropriately when instructions changed, but after switching continued in the same matching strategy, always relying on similarity of appearance. N. G. tended toward the same pattern, switching from left to right hemisphere when instructions changed from function to appearance, but persisting in functional matches. L. B. switched strategies appropriately and tended to retain processing in the left hemisphere.
The various observations taken together can leave little doubt that tnetacontrol systems exist, that these systems tend to activate that hemisphere which is appropriate for some task, and that they do so independently of whether the then activated hemisphere actually utilizes its specializations. On some occasions, however, the metacontrol systems can fail to arouse the appropriately specialized hemisphere, in spite of the fact that the other one must then proceed to perform in a cognitively inappropriate mode. It is clearly the case that, in general, dominance of one hemisphere over behavior cannot merely be due to a skill or speed contest between the two halves of the brain, but must depend on the expectations as to cognitive requirements, irrespective of whether those cognitive specialities are actually utilized. It would appear that hemispheric activation does not depend on the hemisphere's real aptitude, but on what it thinks it can do.
Metaphorically, one may conceive of the two cerebral hemispheres as supplicants asking a single intentional system for activa-
